Contract--Accord and Satisfaction--Executory Accord (Atterbury, et al. v. James F. Walsh Paper Corporation, et al., 261 App. Div. 529 (1st Dep\u27t 1941)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 16 




Contract--Accord and Satisfaction--Executory Accord (Atterbury, 
et al. v. James F. Walsh Paper Corporation, et al., 261 App. Div. 
529 (1st Dep't 1941)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1941) "Contract--Accord and Satisfaction--Executory Accord (Atterbury, et al. v. 
James F. Walsh Paper Corporation, et al., 261 App. Div. 529 (1st Dep't 1941))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 
16 : No. 1 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss1/12 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The courts of today realize that milk is a public utility 'Z-that
it is affected with a public interest-and that being so, it is forced
to submit to public control by the exercise of the police power.13 The
ordinance in question 14 cannot be attacked on the ground that it
fosters monopoly; that is its purpose.15 The power to turn industries
into monopolies--controlled by the state-is a social and economic de-
vice by which the industry is kept under constant supervision and the
welfare of the public protected. Of course, no person may be granted
a monopoly as a favor or reward, but where there is reasonable ground
for the legislative conclusion that effective service can only be obtained
by curtailing the right to enter the business, that is consistent with
the due process clause of the Federal and State Constitutions. 16
This, then, is the meaning of the Stracquadanio decision. Here
we find the historical trend of state control of public callings extended
-strangely enough by an operative limitation.17  The trend, if ex-
tended to its logical conclusion, might bring us to a day when a milk
dealer who sells to all comers indiscriminately may be held liable for
a refusal to sell milk, if he has it for sale, to any comer with the
price,' 8 which is the final test for a public utility.19
K. S. S.
CONTRACT-ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-EXECUTORY AccoRD.
-The plaintiff corporation installed a machine in the defendants'
premises for experimental purposes in December, 1939, and in May,
1940 the defendants demanded $6,786.82 for materials furnished in
connection with the machine and for the use of the facilities of the
12 In Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934), the
Court said: "We might as well say at once that the dairy industry is not, in
the accepted sense of the phrase, a public utility." The fact remains, however,
that not only in the Nebbia case but also in subsequent decisions, the milk
industry is treated as a public utility. E.g., note 13, infra,
13 Stracquadanio v. Department of Health of City of New York, 285
N. Y. 93, 32 N. E. (2d) 806 (1941), wherein the court says, "The distribution
of milk is a business affected with a public interest-a phrase which has been
defined as '* * * the equivalent of subject to the exercise of the police power.'"
'14 Regulation of the Board of Health, 3-a, subd. 3-b (3).
15 The opinions presented in this paragraph are those of Justice Brandeis
in his dissent to the opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebinain, 285 U. S. 262,
52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932). In his opinion Justice Brandeis struck out boldly at
the notion that the police power of the state cannot be utilized as a means of
creating a monopoly where the social and economic conditions of the state
warrant the exercise of such power. It is significant to note that Justice
Stone, now Chief Justice, concurred in the dissent
16 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932).
'7 Wigmore, Nova Methodus Discendae Docendaeque .urirprudentiae
(1917) 30 HARV. L. REv. 812, 823, 824.
18 See EDGAR AND EDGAR, WORKBOOK oN BAILMENTS, INNKEEPERS AND
CARRIERs (1941) 181, for historical background of public utilities.
19 Y. TRANSPORTATION CoRPORATIONS LAW § 12.
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defendant corporation. The defendants brought suit on this demand,
and during the pendency of the action, a settlement was reached, as
evidenced by a letter from the plaintiffs' attorney to the defendants'
attorney. There was no other writing. Such settlement allowed the
plaintiff corporation to remove the machine and pay the defendant
corporation the sum of $500.00 within twenty-four hours after re-
moval. The terms of this agreement were not carried out and the
defendants continued to prosecute the original action, whereupon the
plaintiffs brought the present action, after setting up the foregoing
facts, praying for specific performance of the agreement and asking
that the defendants be enjoined from pursuing their original action.
The Special Term denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the com-
plaint while finding that the agreement was a superseding contract,1
taking the place of the original contract relating to the installation
of the machinery, and therefore enforcible. The Special Term grant-
ed the plaintiffs specific performance and enjoined the defendants'
from prosecuting their action. On appeal, held, order reversed, and
defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint granted. The agreement
upon which the plaintiffs base their claim is an executory accord and
not a superseding contract, because until the future performances, as
provided for by the agreement, were completed, there was no accord
between the parties. Therefore such agreement is not valid as within
Section 33-a, subdivisions 2 and 3 of the Personal Property Law,2
which requires executory accords to be in writing and signed by the
party against whom it is sought to be enforced in order to be valid.
Atterbury, et al. v. Janws F. Walsh Paper Corporation, et al., 261.
App. Div. 529, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 43 (1st Dep't, 1941).
Prior to the passage of Sections 33-a and ba of the Personal
I "A superseding contract is a new and superior contract superseding and
extinguishing the contract or contracts upon which the original action was
based. * ** It relates to matters of differences and controversies other than, as
Well as, those involved in the original action." Moers v. Moers, 229 N. Y. 294,
128 N. E. 202 (1920).
2 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33-a, subd. 2: "An executory accord, hereafter
made, shall not be denied effect as a defense or as the basis of an action or
counterclaim by reason of the fact that the satisfaction or discharge of the
claim, cause of action, contract, obligation, lease, mortgage or other security
interest which is the subject of the accord was to occur at a time after the
making of the accord, provided the promise of the party against whom it is
sought to enforce the accord is in Writing and signed by such party."
N. Y. PERS. PRoP. LAW § 33-a, subd. 3: "If an executory accord is not
performed according to its terms by one party, the other party shall be entitled
either to assert his rights under the claim, cause of action, contract, obligation,
lease, mortgage or other security interest which is the subject of the accord, or
to assert his rights under the accord7'
3 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33-b: "An offer in writing, hereafter made,
signed by the offeror, to accept a performance therein designated in satisfaction
or discharge in whole or in part of any claim, cause of action, contract, obliga-
tion, or lease, or any mortgage or other security interest in personal or real
property, followed by tender of such performance by the offeree before revoca-
tion of the offer, shall not be denied effect as a defense or as the basis of an
11 1]
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Property Law, the principles of which govern the ruling of this case,
the common-law rule prevailed in New York and in most other states
that an accord was not binding upon the parties until it was executed 4
and an executory accord, therefore, did not discharge the original
obligation and was not a valid defense to an action on the original
obligation.5 The rule also was that a tender of satisfaction under the
executory accord did not make the accord executed and did not dis-
charge the original obligation unless such tender was accepted.6 Such
a ruling was based upon sound principles as it would be unfair to a
creditor to discharge his original cause of action by an executory ac-
cord which might never be executed and would, in effect, only reduce
the obligation of the debtor. However, it was also unfair to the
debtor if, after making an executory agreement, the creditor could,
without delay, sue upon the original cause of action in utter disre-
gard to the accord. Because of this there was a disagreement among
the decisions of the states; some holding rigidly with the common
law, while others, looking at the equitable side of the controversy,
held the accord to discharge the original action and to preclude suit.7
This controversy was settled in New York when, in 1937, the legis-
lature amended Section 33 of the Personal Property Law by passing
Sections 33-a and b. This change in the law gave force to an execu-
tory accord, providing such accord was in writing and signed by the
party against whom it was sought to be enforced, and also gave effect
to a tender of satisfaction by the debtor so as to make an accord in
writing, signed by the creditor, a good defense to a suit on the orig-
inal cause of action even though the tender was not accepted by the
creditor. The Restatement also leaned towards the equitable side of
the controversy,8 but it did not go so far as the New York legislature.
In the present case, the executory accord was only signed by the
plaintiffs' attorney and not by the defendants or the defendants' at-
torney and the plaintiffs could not therefore hold the defendants to
action or counterclaim by reason of the fact that such tender was not accepted
by the offeror."
4 Kromer v. Heim, 75 N. Y. 574 (1879) ; Bandman v. Finn, 185 N. Y. 508,
78 N. E. 175, 12 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1134 and note (1906) ; Hearn v. Kiehl, 38
Pa. St. 147, 80 Am. Dec. 472 (1861).
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed.) § 1842; Stadler v. Ciprian, 265 Mich.
252, 251 N. W. 404 (1933); Moers v. Moers, 229 N. Y. 294, 128 N. E. 202
(1920).
6 WILLIsT-oN, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed.) § 1843; Larscy v. Hogan, 239 N. Y.
298, 146 N. E. 430 (1925); Reilly v. Barret, 220 N. Y. 170, 115 N. E. 453
(1917).
7 Buschmann v. McDermott, 154 App. Div. 515, 139 N. Y. Supp. 314 (1st
Dep't 1913); American Bonding Co. v. Kelly, 172 App. Div. 437, 158 N. Y.
Supp. 812 (1916), af'd, 225 N. Y. 641, 121 N. E. 890 (1919); Smith v. Smith,
214 App. Div. 383, 212 N. Y. Supp. 196 (3d Dep't 1925).
8 RESTATEMENT § 417(a). The contract of accord "does not discharge the
debtor's duty, but suspends the right to enforce it as long as there has been
neither a breach of the contract nor a justification for the creditor in changing
his position because of its prospective non-performance."
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such accord as the common-law ruling prevails unless the accord
comes up to the specifications of the statute.
A. S.C.
CONTRACTS -CONTRACTS FOR BENEFIT or THIlR PARTY-
TRUSTS-TESTAMENTARY DIsPosITIONs.-This is a proceeding by
an executor to render and settle an account. Decedent made a loan
of five hundred dollars, on collateral security, to her executor and his
wife, as evidenced by a note and an agreement. The agreement pro-
vided that in the event of decedent's death before satisfaction of the
debt, the note with the collateral security was to revert to the named
son of the executor and his wife. The evidence shows that decedent
had previously opened a savings account in her name in trust for said
son of the executor and his wife and on the date of the loan had with-
drawn five hundred dollars from this account, which was presumably
the sum loaned to the executor and his wife the same day. Decedent
died before payment of the debt and the executor has purported to
indorse and deliver the note, together with the collateral security, to
his son without having made any effort to collect the sum due. De-
cedent's sole legatee objects to said transfer by reason of the admitted
failure of the executor to make any effort to collect the debt. Held,
objections sustained. The transfer of the note and the accompanying
collateral security to the son was improper and the executor was
guilty of culpable neglect in failing to collect payment on the note from
his co-maker, if not from himself, since the co-maker was jointly and
severally liable thereon' and proof shows resources ample for pay-
ment. In re McCabe's Estate, 176 Misc. 286, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 127
(1941).
The accountant's contention that the agreement constituted a con-
tract for the benefit of a third person 2 and enforcible by such third
person 3 had no applicability under the present facts.4 Contracts
made for the benefit of third persons are executed contracts, where
the promisee is unable to revoke or control the promisor in the ful-
l NEGOTIABLE INsTRUMENTs LAW §§ 55, 110. (See also, id. § 36, which
reads in part: "* * * (7) Where an instrument containing the words 'I promise
to pay' is signed by two or more persons, they are deemed to be jointly and
severally liable thereon.")
22 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs (Rev. ed. 1936) § 347; WHITNEY, CONTRAcTs
(3d ed. 1937) § 76.
3 Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639, 2 A. L. R. 1187 (1918);
Litchfield v. Flint, 104 N. Y. 543, 11 N. E. 58, 5 N. Y. St Rep. 800 (1887);
Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181, 47 Am. Rep. 20 (1884); Little v. Banks, 85
N. Y. 258, aff'g, 20 Hun 143 (1881); Barker v. Bradley, 42 N. Y. 316, 1 Am.
Rep. 521 (1870); Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
4 McCarthy v. Pieret, 281 N. Y. 407, 24 N. E. (2d) 102 (1939), reargit-
ment denied, 282 N. Y. 800, 27 N. E. (2d) 207 (1940).
1941]
